Proofs of No Intrusion

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2510.06432v1
• Date: Tue, 07 Oct 2025 20:11:20 GMT
• Title: Proofs of No Intrusion
• Authors: Vipul Goyal, Justin Raizes,
• Abstract summary: We introduce Proofs of No Intrusion, which enable a classical client to remotely test whether a quantum server has been hacked.<n>The test does not destroy the data being tested, avoiding the need to store a backup elsewhere.<n>We show how to equip several constructions of unclonable primitives with proofs of non-intrusion.
• Score: 9.813075714350743
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: A central challenge in data security is not just preventing theft, but detecting whether it has occurred. Classically, this is impossible because a perfect copy leaves no evidence. Quantum mechanics, on the other hand, forbids general duplication, opening up new possibilities. We introduce Proofs of No Intrusion, which enable a classical client to remotely test whether a quantum server has been hacked and the client's data stolen. Crucially, the test does not destroy the data being tested, avoiding the need to store a backup elsewhere. We define and construct proofs of no intrusion for ciphertexts assuming fully homomorphic encryption. Additionally, we show how to equip several constructions of unclonable primitives with proofs of non-intrusion, such as unclonable decryption keys and signature tokens. Conceptually, proofs of non-intrusion can be defined for essentially any unclonable primitive. At the heart of our techniques is a new method for non-destructively testing coset states with classical communication. It can be viewed as a non-destructive proof of knowledge of a measurement result of the coset state.

Related papers

• Witnessd: Proof-of-process via Adversarial Collapse [0.0]
  We address the gap between cryptographic integrity and process provenance.<n>We introduce proof-of-process, a primitive category for evidence that a physical process, not merely a signing key, produced a digital artifact.<n>We present Witnessd, an architecture combining jitter seals with Verifiable Delay Functions, external timestamp anchors, dual-source keystroke validation.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2026-02-02T05:30:21Z)
• Cloning Games, Black Holes and Cryptography [50.022147589030304]
  We introduce a new toolkit for analyzing cloning games.<n>This framework allows us to analyze a new cloning game based on binary phase states.<n>We show that the binary phase variantally optimal bound offers quantitative insights into information scrambling in idealized models of black holes.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2024-11-07T14:09:32Z)
• Relating Quantum Tamper-Evident Encryption to Other Cryptographic Notions [0.0]
  A quantum tamper-evident encryption scheme is a non-interactive symmetric-key encryption scheme mapping classical messages to quantum ciphertexts.<n>This quantum cryptographic primitive was first introduced by Gottesman in 2003.<n>We further our understanding of tamper-evident encryption by formally relating it to other quantum cryptographic primitives in an information-theoretic setting.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2024-11-05T02:20:29Z)
• Untelegraphable Encryption and its Applications [11.202085166442346]
  We initiate the study of untelegraphable encryption (UTE), founded on the no-telegraphing principle.<n>This is a natural relaxation of unclonable encryption (UE), inspired by the recent work of Nehoran and Zhandry (ITCS 2024)<n>We give several applications of UTE and study the interplay of UTE with UE and quantum state learning.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2024-10-31T17:50:53Z)
• Simultaneous Haar Indistinguishability with Applications to Unclonable Cryptography [5.360892674012226]
  We present a new approach to unclonable encryption via a reduction to a novel question about nonlocal quantum state discrimination. Our main technical result is showing that the players cannot distinguish between each player receiving independently-chosen Haar random states versus all players receiving the same Haar random state. We also show other implications to single-decryptor encryption and leakage-resilient secret sharing.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2024-05-16T17:30:55Z)
• Rethinking Backdoor Attacks [122.1008188058615]
  In a backdoor attack, an adversary inserts maliciously constructed backdoor examples into a training set to make the resulting model vulnerable to manipulation. Defending against such attacks typically involves viewing these inserted examples as outliers in the training set and using techniques from robust statistics to detect and remove them. We show that without structural information about the training data distribution, backdoor attacks are indistinguishable from naturally-occurring features in the data.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2023-07-19T17:44:54Z)
• Revocable Cryptography from Learning with Errors [61.470151825577034]
  We build on the no-cloning principle of quantum mechanics and design cryptographic schemes with key-revocation capabilities. We consider schemes where secret keys are represented as quantum states with the guarantee that, once the secret key is successfully revoked from a user, they no longer have the ability to perform the same functionality as before.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2023-02-28T18:58:11Z)
• Quantum Proofs of Deletion for Learning with Errors [91.3755431537592]
  We construct the first fully homomorphic encryption scheme with certified deletion. Our main technical ingredient is an interactive protocol by which a quantum prover can convince a classical verifier that a sample from the Learning with Errors distribution in the form of a quantum state was deleted.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2022-03-03T10:07:32Z)
• Hidden Cosets and Applications to Unclonable Cryptography [15.248351992500078]
  We study a generalization of hidden subspace states to hidden coset states (first introduced by Aaronson and Christiano [STOC '12]). We explore unclonable properties of coset states and several applications.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2021-07-12T19:04:01Z)
• Hidden Killer: Invisible Textual Backdoor Attacks with Syntactic Trigger [48.59965356276387]
  We propose to use syntactic structure as the trigger in textual backdoor attacks. We conduct extensive experiments to demonstrate that the trigger-based attack method can achieve comparable attack performance. These results also reveal the significant insidiousness and harmfulness of textual backdoor attacks.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2021-05-26T08:54:19Z)
• Backdoor Attack against Speaker Verification [86.43395230456339]
  We show that it is possible to inject the hidden backdoor for infecting speaker verification models by poisoning the training data. We also demonstrate that existing backdoor attacks cannot be directly adopted in attacking speaker verification.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2020-10-22T11:10:08Z)

This list is automatically generated from the titles and abstracts of the papers in this site.

This site does not guarantee the quality of this site (including all information) and is not responsible for any consequences.