It's a Feature, Not a Bug: Secure and Auditable State Rollback for Confidential Cloud Applications
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2511.13641v1
- Date: Mon, 17 Nov 2025 17:53:47 GMT
- Title: It's a Feature, Not a Bug: Secure and Auditable State Rollback for Confidential Cloud Applications
- Authors: Quinn Burke, Anjo Vahldiek-Oberwagner, Michael Swift, Patrick McDaniel,
- Abstract summary: Rebound is a general-purpose security framework that preserves rollback protection while enabling policy-authorized legitimate rollbacks of application binaries, configuration, and data.<n>Key to Rebound is a reference monitor that mediates state transitions, enforces authorization policy, guarantees atomicity of state updates and rollbacks, and emits a tamper-evident log that provides transparency to applications and auditors.
- Score: 3.903754621026016
- License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
- Abstract: Replay and rollback attacks threaten cloud application integrity by reintroducing authentic yet stale data through an untrusted storage interface to compromise application decision-making. Prior security frameworks mitigate these attacks by enforcing forward-only state transitions (state continuity) with hardware-backed mechanisms, but they categorically treat all rollback as malicious and thus preclude legitimate rollbacks used for operational recovery from corruption or misconfiguration. We present Rebound, a general-purpose security framework that preserves rollback protection while enabling policy-authorized legitimate rollbacks of application binaries, configuration, and data. Key to Rebound is a reference monitor that mediates state transitions, enforces authorization policy, guarantees atomicity of state updates and rollbacks, and emits a tamper-evident log that provides transparency to applications and auditors. We formally prove Rebound's security properties and show through an application case study -- with software deployment workflows in GitLab CI -- that it enables robust control over binary, configuration, and raw data versioning with low end-to-end overhead.
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