Hashpower allocation in Pay-per-Share blockchain mining pools

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2511.13777v1
• Date: Sat, 15 Nov 2025 13:42:59 GMT
• Title: Hashpower allocation in Pay-per-Share blockchain mining pools
• Authors: Pierre-Olivier Goffard, Hansjoerg Albrecher, Jean-Pierre Fouque,
• Abstract summary: This article examines a Pay-per-Share (PPS) reward system, where the pool manager can adjust both the share difficulty and the management fee.<n>Using a simplified wealth model for miners, we explore how miners should allocate their computing resources among different mining pools.
• Score: 0.0
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: Mining blocks in a blockchain using the \textit{Proof-of-Work} consensus protocol involves significant risk, as network participants face continuous operational costs while earning infrequent capital gains upon successfully mining a block. A common risk mitigation strategy is to join a mining pool, which combines the computing resources of multiple miners to provide a more stable income. This article examines a Pay-per-Share (PPS) reward system, where the pool manager can adjust both the share difficulty and the management fee. Using a simplified wealth model for miners, we explore how miners should allocate their computing resources among different mining pools, considering the trade-off between risk transfer to the manager and management fees.

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