Membership Inference Attacks Beyond Overfitting

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2511.16792v1
• Date: Thu, 20 Nov 2025 20:40:56 GMT
• Title: Membership Inference Attacks Beyond Overfitting
• Authors: Mona Khalil, Alberto Blanco-Justicia, Najeeb Jebreel, Josep Domingo-Ferrer,
• Abstract summary: Membership inference attacks (MIAs) aim to determine whether a given data point was part of the model training data.<n>MIAs exploit differences in the behavior of a model when making predictions on samples it has seen during training.<n>Even non-overfitted ML models can leak information about a small subset of their training data.
• Score: 3.549717032380187
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Membership inference attacks (MIAs) against machine learning (ML) models aim to determine whether a given data point was part of the model training data. These attacks may pose significant privacy risks to individuals whose sensitive data were used for training, which motivates the use of defenses such as differential privacy, often at the cost of high accuracy losses. MIAs exploit the differences in the behavior of a model when making predictions on samples it has seen during training (members) versus those it has not seen (non-members). Several studies have pointed out that model overfitting is the major factor contributing to these differences in behavior and, consequently, to the success of MIAs. However, the literature also shows that even non-overfitted ML models can leak information about a small subset of their training data. In this paper, we investigate the root causes of membership inference vulnerabilities beyond traditional overfitting concerns and suggest targeted defenses. We empirically analyze the characteristics of the training data samples vulnerable to MIAs in models that are not overfitted (and hence able to generalize). Our findings reveal that these samples are often outliers within their classes (e.g., noisy or hard to classify). We then propose potential defensive strategies to protect these vulnerable samples and enhance the privacy-preserving capabilities of ML models. Our code is available at https://github.com/najeebjebreel/mia_analysis.

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