Automating Deception: Scalable Multi-Turn LLM Jailbreaks
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2511.19517v1
- Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2025 03:15:11 GMT
- Title: Automating Deception: Scalable Multi-Turn LLM Jailbreaks
- Abstract summary: Multi-turn conversational attacks, which leverage psychological principles like Foot-in-the-Door (FITD), pose a persistent threat to Large Language Models (LLMs)<n>This paper introduces a novel, automated pipeline for generating large-scale, psychologically-grounded multi-turn jailbreak datasets.<n>We evaluate seven models from three major LLM families under both multi-turn (with history) and single-turn (without history) conditions.
- Score: 0.7212939068975618
- License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
- Abstract: Multi-turn conversational attacks, which leverage psychological principles like Foot-in-the-Door (FITD), where a small initial request paves the way for a more significant one, to bypass safety alignments, pose a persistent threat to Large Language Models (LLMs). Progress in defending against these attacks is hindered by a reliance on manual, hard-to-scale dataset creation. This paper introduces a novel, automated pipeline for generating large-scale, psychologically-grounded multi-turn jailbreak datasets. We systematically operationalize FITD techniques into reproducible templates, creating a benchmark of 1,500 scenarios across illegal activities and offensive content. We evaluate seven models from three major LLM families under both multi-turn (with history) and single-turn (without history) conditions. Our results reveal stark differences in contextual robustness: models in the GPT family demonstrate a significant vulnerability to conversational history, with Attack Success Rates (ASR) increasing by as much as 32 percentage points. In contrast, Google's Gemini 2.5 Flash exhibits exceptional resilience, proving nearly immune to these attacks, while Anthropic's Claude 3 Haiku shows strong but imperfect resistance. These findings highlight a critical divergence in how current safety architectures handle conversational context and underscore the need for defenses that can resist narrative-based manipulation.
Related papers
- Benchmarking Factual Robustness of LLMs via Multi-conversation Persuasion [0.0]
Red-teaming frameworks evaluate models in multi-turn dialogues where the target model retains conversation history.<n>We introduce the textbfSAST-IR (Stateful Attacker, Stateless Target - Iterative Refinement) framework.<n>We simulate a worst-case adversarial setting using textbfmulti-turn (stateless) iterations.<n>Simple, diverse attack strategies achieved a staggering textbf96% success rate, exposing severe brittleness in memory-less defense.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2026-09-15T07:46:01Z) - PAST2HARM: A Simple Adaptive Past Tense Attack for Jailbreaking Multimodal AI [0.0]
PAST2HARM is a adaptive jailbreak framework that bypasses refusal training in state of the art multimodal text to image models.<n>We evaluate PAST2HARM on three models Gemini Nano Banana Pro, GPT Image 2, and SD XL achieving attack success rates of 83 percent, 67 percent, and 100 percent in a black box, gradient free setting.<n>The attack elicits diverse harmful outputs, including explicit sexual content, political disinformation, historical denial narratives, hate speech, and self harm glorification.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2026-05-26T18:16:22Z) - SEMA: Simple yet Effective Learning for Multi-Turn Jailbreak Attacks [53.97948802255959]
We propose a framework that trains a multi-turn attacker without relying on any existing strategies or external data.<n>Prefilling self-tuning enables usable rollouts by fine-tuning on non-refusal, well-structured, multi-turn adversarial prompts.<n>We anchor harmful intent in multi-turn jailbreaks via an intent-drift-aware reward that combines intent alignment, compliance risk, and level of detail.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2026-02-06T16:44:57Z) - Pattern Enhanced Multi-Turn Jailbreaking: Exploiting Structural Vulnerabilities in Large Language Models [9.744463020852615]
Multi-turn jailbreaking attacks target different harm categories through distinct conversational approaches.<n>We propose Pattern Enhanced Chain of Attack (PE-CoA) to construct effective multi-turn jailbreaks through natural dialogue.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2025-10-09T23:26:28Z) - T2VShield: Model-Agnostic Jailbreak Defense for Text-to-Video Models [88.63040835652902]
Text to video models are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, where specially crafted prompts bypass safety mechanisms and lead to the generation of harmful or unsafe content.<n>We propose T2VShield, a comprehensive and model agnostic defense framework designed to protect text to video models from jailbreak threats.<n>Our method systematically analyzes the input, model, and output stages to identify the limitations of existing defenses.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2025-04-22T01:18:42Z) - MIRAGE: Multimodal Immersive Reasoning and Guided Exploration for Red-Team Jailbreak Attacks [85.3303135160762]
MIRAGE is a novel framework that exploits narrative-driven context and role immersion to circumvent safety mechanisms in Multimodal Large Language Models.<n>It achieves state-of-the-art performance, improving attack success rates by up to 17.5% over the best baselines.<n>We demonstrate that role immersion and structured semantic reconstruction can activate inherent model biases, facilitating the model's spontaneous violation of ethical safeguards.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2025-03-24T20:38:42Z) - Reasoning-Augmented Conversation for Multi-Turn Jailbreak Attacks on Large Language Models [53.580928907886324]
Reasoning-Augmented Conversation is a novel multi-turn jailbreak framework.<n>It reformulates harmful queries into benign reasoning tasks.<n>We show that RACE achieves state-of-the-art attack effectiveness in complex conversational scenarios.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2025-02-16T09:27:44Z) - Turning Logic Against Itself : Probing Model Defenses Through Contrastive Questions [50.40122190627256]
We introduce POATE, a novel jailbreak technique that harnesses contrastive reasoning to provoke unethical responses.<n>PoATE crafts semantically opposing intents and integrates them with adversarial templates, steering models toward harmful outputs with remarkable subtlety.<n>To counter this, we propose Intent-Aware CoT and Reverse Thinking CoT, which decompose queries to detect malicious intent and reason in reverse to evaluate and reject harmful responses.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2025-01-03T15:40:03Z) - Mind Your Questions! Towards Backdoor Attacks on Text-to-Visualization Models [21.2448592823259]
VisPoison is a framework designed to identify these vulnerabilities of text-to-vis models systematically.
We show that VisPoison achieves attack success rates of over 90%, highlighting the security problem of current text-to-vis models.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2024-10-09T11:22:03Z) - Multi-Turn Context Jailbreak Attack on Large Language Models From First Principles [2.5167155755957316]
Context Fusion Attack (CFA) is a contextual fusion black-box jailbreak attack method.
We show CFA's superior success rate, divergence, and harmfulness compared to other multi-turn attack strategies.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2024-08-08T09:18:47Z) - Imposter.AI: Adversarial Attacks with Hidden Intentions towards Aligned Large Language Models [13.225041704917905]
This study unveils an attack mechanism that capitalizes on human conversation strategies to extract harmful information from large language models.
Unlike conventional methods that target explicit malicious responses, our approach delves deeper into the nature of the information provided in responses.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2024-07-22T06:04:29Z) - Weak-to-Strong Jailbreaking on Large Language Models [92.52448762164926]
Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks.<n>Existing jailbreaking methods are computationally costly.<n>We propose the weak-to-strong jailbreaking attack.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2024-01-30T18:48:37Z)
This list is automatically generated from the titles and abstracts of the papers in this site.
This site does not guarantee the quality of this site (including all information) and is not responsible for any consequences.