pokiSEC: A Multi-Architecture, Containerized Ephemeral Malware Detonation Sandbox

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2512.20860v1
• Date: Wed, 24 Dec 2025 00:38:40 GMT
• Title: pokiSEC: A Multi-Architecture, Containerized Ephemeral Malware Detonation Sandbox
• Authors: Alejandro Avina, Yashas Hariprasad, Naveen Kumar Chaudhary,
• Abstract summary: pokiSEC is a lightweight, ephemeral malware detonation sandbox inside a Docker container.<n> pokiSEC integrates QEMU with hardware acceleration (KVM when available) and exposes a browser-based workflow.<n>We validate pokiSEC on Apple Silicon and Ubuntu (AMD64)
• Score: 41.99844472131922
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Dynamic malware analysis requires executing untrusted binaries inside strongly isolated, rapidly resettable environments. In practice, many detonation workflows remain tied to heavyweight hypervisors or dedicated bare-metal labs, limiting portability and automation. This challenge has intensified with the adoption of ARM64 developer hardware (e.g., Apple Silicon), where common open-source sandbox recipes and pre-built environments frequently assume x86_64 hosts and do not translate cleanly across architectures. This paper presents pokiSEC, a lightweight, ephemeral malware detonation sandbox that packages the full virtualization and access stack inside a Docker container. pokiSEC integrates QEMU with hardware acceleration (KVM when available) and exposes a browser-based workflow that supports bring-your-own Windows disk images. The key contribution is a Universal Entrypoint that performs runtime host-architecture detection and selects validated hypervisor configurations (machine types, acceleration modes, and device profiles), enabling a single container image and codebase to launch Windows guests on both ARM64 and x86_64 hosts. We validate pokiSEC on Apple Silicon (ARM64) and Ubuntu (AMD64), demonstrating interactive performance suitable for analyst workflows and consistent teardown semantics via ephemeral container lifecycles.

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