Raven: Mining Defensive Patterns in Ethereum via Semantic Transaction Revert Invariants Categories

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2512.22616v1
• Date: Sat, 27 Dec 2025 14:47:38 GMT
• Title: Raven: Mining Defensive Patterns in Ethereum via Semantic Transaction Revert Invariants Categories
• Authors: Mojtaba Eshghie, Melissa Mazura, Alexandre Bartel,
• Abstract summary: We frame transactions reverted by invariants-require(invariant>)/ assert(invariant>)/if.<n>Despite their value, the defensive patterns in these transactions remain undiscovered and underutilized in security research.<n>We present Raven, a framework that aligns reverted transactions to the invariant causing the reversion in the smart contract source code.
• Score: 42.72175126929749
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: We frame Ethereum transactions reverted by invariants-require(<invariant>)/ assert(<invariant>)/if (<invariant>) revert statements in the contract implementation-as a positive signal of active on-chain defenses. Despite their value, the defensive patterns in these transactions remain undiscovered and underutilized in security research. We present Raven, a framework that aligns reverted transactions to the invariant causing the reversion in the smart contract source code, embeds these invariants using our BERT-based fine-tuned model, and clusters them by semantic intent to mine defensive invariant categories on Ethereum. Evaluated on a sample of 20,000 reverted transactions, Raven achieves cohesive and meaningful clusters of transaction-reverting invariants. Manual expert review of the mined 19 semantic clusters uncovers six new invariant categories absent from existing invariant catalogs, including feature toggles, replay prevention, proof/signature verification, counters, caller-provided slippage thresholds, and allow/ban/bot lists. To demonstrate the practical utility of this invariant catalog mining pipeline, we conduct a case study using one of the newly discovered invariant categories as a fuzzing oracle to detect vulnerabilities in a real-world attack. Raven thus can map Ethereum's successful defenses. These invariant categories enable security researchers to develop analysis tools based on data-driven security oracles extracted from the smart contracts' working defenses.

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