QuietPrint: Protecting 3D Printers Against Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2602.02198v1
• Date: Mon, 02 Feb 2026 15:04:00 GMT
• Title: QuietPrint: Protecting 3D Printers Against Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks
• Authors: Seyed Ali Ghazi Asgar, Narasimha Reddy,
• Abstract summary: Cyber-attacks targeting the 3D printing process are becoming increasingly common.<n>One major concern is intellectual property (IP) theft, where a malicious attacker gains access to the design file.<n>In this work, we investigate the possibility of IP theft via acoustic side channels and propose a novel method to protect 3D printers.
• Score: 0.5729426778193398
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: The 3D printing market has experienced significant growth in recent years, with an estimated revenue of 15 billion USD for 2025. Cyber-attacks targeting the 3D printing process whether through the machine itself, the supply chain, or the fabricated components are becoming increasingly common. One major concern is intellectual property (IP) theft, where a malicious attacker gains access to the design file. One method for carrying out such theft is through side-channel attacks. In this work, we investigate the possibility of IP theft via acoustic side channels and propose a novel method to protect 3D printers against such attacks. The primary advantage of our approach is that it requires no additional hardware, such as large speakers or noise-canceling devices. Instead, it secures printed parts by minimal modifications to the G-code.

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