Simpler Than You Think: The Practical Dynamics of Ranked Choice Voting

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2602.14329v1
• Date: Sun, 15 Feb 2026 22:51:59 GMT
• Title: Simpler Than You Think: The Practical Dynamics of Ranked Choice Voting
• Authors: Sanyukta Deshpande, Nikhil Garg, Sheldon H. Jacobson,
• Abstract summary: Ranked Choice Voting (RCV) adoption is expanding across U.S. elections, but faces persistent criticism for complexity, strategic manipulation, and ballot exhaustion.<n>We empirically test these concerns on real election data, across three diverse contexts: New York City's 2021 Democratic primaries (54 races), Alaska's 2024 primary-infused statewide elections (52 races), and Portland's 2024 multi-winner City Council elections (4 races)<n>Our findings reveal that RCV consistently exhibits simple and transparent dynamics in practice, closely mirroring the interpretability of plurality elections.
• Score: 4.3823377140757485
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: Ranked Choice Voting (RCV) adoption is expanding across U.S. elections, but faces persistent criticism for complexity, strategic manipulation, and ballot exhaustion. We empirically test these concerns on real election data, across three diverse contexts: New York City's 2021 Democratic primaries (54 races), Alaska's 2024 primary-infused statewide elections (52 races), and Portland's 2024 multi-winner City Council elections (4 races). Our algorithmic approach circumvents computational complexity barriers by reducing election instance sizes (via candidate elimination). Our findings reveal that despite its intricate multi-round process and theoretical vulnerabilities, RCV consistently exhibits simple and transparent dynamics in practice, closely mirroring the interpretability of plurality elections. Following RCV adoption, competitiveness increased substantially compared to prior plurality elections, with average margins of victory declining by 9.2 percentage points in NYC and 11.4 points in Alaska. Empirically, complex ballot-addition strategies are not more efficient than simple ones, and ballot exhaustion has minimal impact, altering outcomes in only 3 of 110 elections. These findings demonstrate that RCV delivers measurable democratic benefits while proving robust to ballot-addition manipulation, resilient to ballot exhaustion effects, and maintaining transparent competitive dynamics in practice. The computational framework offers election administrators and researchers tools for immediate election-night analysis and facilitating clearer discourse around election dynamics.

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