Measuring the Authority Stack of AI Systems: Empirical Analysis of 366,120 Forced-Choice Responses Across 8 AI Models

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2604.11216v1
• Date: Mon, 13 Apr 2026 09:13:32 GMT
• Title: Measuring the Authority Stack of AI Systems: Empirical Analysis of 366,120 Forced-Choice Responses Across 8 AI Models
• Abstract summary: We present the first large-scale empirical mapping of AI decision-making across all three layers of the Authority Stack framework.<n>We evaluated 8 major AI models at temperature 0, yielding 366,120 total responses.
• Score: 3.7184769644515896
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: What values, evidence preferences, and source trust hierarchies do AI systems actually exhibit when facing structured dilemmas? We present the first large-scale empirical mapping of AI decision-making across all three layers of the Authority Stack framework (S. Lee, 2026a): value priorities (L4), evidence-type preferences (L3), and source trust hierarchies (L2). Using the PRISM benchmark -- a forced-choice instrument of 14,175 unique scenarios per layer, spanning 7 professional domains, 3 severity levels, 3 decision timeframes, and 5 scenario variants -- we evaluated 8 major AI models at temperature 0, yielding 366,120 total responses. Key findings include: (1) a symmetric 4:4 split between Universalism-first and Security-first models at L4; (2) dramatic defense-domain value restructuring where Security surges to near-ceiling win-rates (95.1%-99.8%) in 6 of 8 models; (3) divergent evidence hierarchies at L3, with some models favoring empirical-scientific evidence while others prefer pattern-based or experiential evidence; (4) broad convergence on institutional source trust at L2; and (5) Paired Consistency Scores (PCS) ranging from 57.4% to 69.2%, revealing substantial framing sensitivity across scenario variants. Test-Retest Reliability (TRR) ranges from 91.7% to 98.6%, indicating that value instability stems primarily from variant sensitivity rather than stochastic noise. These findings demonstrate that AI models possess measurable -- if sometimes unstable -- Authority Stacks with consequential implications for deployment across professional domains.

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