Firmware Distribution as Attack Surface: A Security Study of ASIC Cryptocurrency Miners

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2605.03770v2
• Date: Wed, 06 May 2026 07:24:31 GMT
• Title: Firmware Distribution as Attack Surface: A Security Study of ASIC Cryptocurrency Miners
• Abstract summary: We show that the firmware distribution ecosystem of mining devices fundamentally challenges existing trust assumptions.<n>We reconstruct and analyze 134 firmware images spanning manufacturers that account for over 99% of deployed miners.<n>Our analysis reveals vulnerabilities that enable realistic large-scale attack scenarios.
• Score: 1.3266402517619373
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
• Abstract: ASIC cryptocurrency miners are a core component of blockchain infrastructures, directly converting computation and energy into monetary value. Despite their economic importance, their security is rarely evaluated in a structured manner. In this paper, we show that the firmware distribution ecosystem of mining devices fundamentally challenges existing trust assumptions. We introduce a scalable methodology based on the collection and static analysis of publicly distributed firmware artifacts, requiring neither device access nor runtime interaction. Applying this approach, we reconstruct and analyze 134 firmware images spanning manufacturers that account for over 99% of deployed miners (Bitmain, MicroBT, Canaan, Iceriver). Our results reveal that firmware artifacts alone are sufficient to recover internal architecture, identify security weaknesses, and reconstruct complete attack paths leading to high-impact adversarial objectives. In particular, our analysis reveals vulnerabilities that enable realistic large-scale attack scenarios, including firmware phishing and the exploitation of miners still operating over Stratum V1. Validation on two real devices confirms that publicly distributed artifacts closely reflect deployed software and that these weaknesses translate into attack capabilities. Overall, our study shows that firmware distribution mechanisms themselves constitute a primary attack surface, significantly lowering the barrier to compromise in the ASIC mining ecosystem.

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