Near-Optimal Last-Iterate Convergence for Zero-Sum Games with Bandit Feedback and Opponent Actions
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2605.09363v1
- Date: Sun, 10 May 2026 06:23:19 GMT
- Title: Near-Optimal Last-Iterate Convergence for Zero-Sum Games with Bandit Feedback and Opponent Actions
- Abstract summary: Last-iterate convergence of learning dynamics in games has attracted significant recent attention.<n>We show that t(-1/2) last-iterate convergence is achievable with high probability in games with bandit feedback.
- Score: 43.45624707071202
- License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
- Abstract: Last-iterate convergence of learning dynamics in games has attracted significant recent attention. In two-player zero-sum games with bandit feedback, where only the loss of the selected action pair is observed, Fiegel et al. (2025) show a separation between average-iterate and last-iterate convergence in duality gap: while the optimal t^(-1/2) rate after t rounds is achievable for the former via standard no-regret algorithms, the latter cannot converge faster than t^(-1/3) in expectation or t^(-1/4) with high probability. However, in many practical settings, such as preference learning, the players observe not only their loss but also the opponent's action. This raises a natural question: can such additional information enable faster last-iterate convergence? We answer this question affirmatively, showing that t^(-1/2) last-iterate convergence is achievable with high probability in this setting, via an efficient algorithm that updates its strategy infrequently by solving an estimated log-barrier-regularized game. We identify fundamental obstacles preventing standard analysis for multi-armed bandits, the single-player case, from generalizing to games, and develop a novel analysis to overcome them. Experiments confirm that our algorithm indeed converges faster than naive baselines and prior methods that do not exploit opponent-action feedback. Finally, we note that our results also improve those for dueling bandits, a special case with skew-symmetric game matrices.
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