Security Analysis of Time-of-Arrival Estimation via Cross-Correlation under Narrow-Band Conditions

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2605.10632v1
• Date: Mon, 11 May 2026 14:21:37 GMT
• Title: Security Analysis of Time-of-Arrival Estimation via Cross-Correlation under Narrow-Band Conditions
• Abstract summary: We present and analyze two new attacks that reshape signals to compromise correlation-based ToA estimation.<n>First attack multiplies the signal by a symbol-periodic waveform in the time domain, while the second passes it through a negative group delay filter.
• Score: 4.4681678689625715
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: Time-of-arrival (ToA) estimation via cross-correlation is an essential building block of time-of-flight ranging. However, in narrowband systems, it is notoriously difficult to protect against distance-decreasing attacks such as Early-Detect/Late-Commit (ED/LC). We present and analyze two new attacks that reshape ranging signals to compromise correlation-based ToA estimation. The first attack multiplies the signal by a symbol-periodic waveform in the time domain, while the second passes it through a negative group delay (NGD) filter. In contrast to ED/LC, our attacks do not require real-time symbol detection or adaptive compensation; they are completely symbol-agnostic. We describe implementation strategies for both attacks and discuss NGD filtering in the context of Bluetooth Channel Sounding (CS), a recent narrowband ranging system. To this end, we simulate an NGD circuit in LTspice and a ToA estimator in MATLAB, demonstrating that the attack can result in distance reductions of up to 18 m against Bluetooth CS RTT ranging. Finally, we verify the feasibility of the NGD approach by building a prototype using commercial off-the-shelf components.

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