On the Geometry of Games and their Solvers

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2605.29919v1
• Date: Thu, 28 May 2026 13:31:49 GMT
• Title: On the Geometry of Games and their Solvers
• Abstract summary: A central challenge in game theory is understanding which algorithms can efficiently compute equilibria across the heterogeneous landscape of games.<n>We study this problem through a solver-game map linking games to effective solver dynamics.<n>A learned structure recogniser maps each game to a low-dimensional solver-aligned representation, and a policy maps this representation to effective primitive mechanisms.<n>This reveals regions where particular solver dynamics are effective and where mixtures of primitives are required rather than a single dominant solver.
• Score: 1.5524043086119061
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: A central challenge in game theory and learning systems such as GANs is understanding which algorithms can efficiently compute equilibria across the heterogeneous landscape of games. Equilibrium computation is typically studied solver by solver and game class by game class, yielding strong local guarantees but a fragmented view of solver behaviour. Existing discrete taxonomies often provide an incomplete account of where algorithms succeed. We study this problem through a solver-game map linking games to effective solver dynamics. Classical theory identifies isolated regions of this map but provides limited insight into intermediate or overlapping regimes, suggesting that solvability is governed by latent structural properties defining a continuous solver-aligned geometry of games. We formalise this perspective through structure-aware solver synthesis. A learned structure recogniser maps each game to a low-dimensional solver-aligned representation, and a policy maps this representation to effective primitive mechanisms, adapting solver behaviour across regimes. This reveals regions where particular solver dynamics are effective and where mixtures of primitives are required rather than a single dominant solver. A bounded residual acts as a local corrector and diagnostic signal for incomplete solver bases or representations. The framework yields both an adaptive solver and an analytical lens: games with similar optimisation dynamics cluster together, revealing continuous regions of algorithmic validity and overlapping solver behaviour. Empirically, we show that fixed primitives exhibit systematic regime mismatch, while the learned representation organises game space into a structured cartography aligned with solver behaviour. These results suggest viewing equilibrium computation as the joint problem of learning solver mechanisms and mapping the geometry of solvability.

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