AI Model Extraction Attacks: Bypassing Single-Client Assumptions in Defenses

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2606.03381v1
• Date: Tue, 02 Jun 2026 09:25:29 GMT
• Title: AI Model Extraction Attacks: Bypassing Single-Client Assumptions in Defenses
• Abstract summary: Model Extraction Attacks (MEAs) enable adversaries to replicate proprietary models, compromise protected information, and prepare offline adversarial attacks.<n>Current defense strategies predominantly rely on the Single Client Assumption (SCA), which is the implicit assumption that attacks originate from isolated identities.<n>We introduce a modular, open-source framework called CerberusAI for reproducible model-stealing research, and use it to simulate distributed attack scenarios.
• Score: 1.247917923987062
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: Ensuring the protection of Artificial Intelligence (AI) models deployed in military Command and Control (C2) systems and critical infrastructure is essential for maintaining information superiority. Model Extraction Attacks (MEAs) pose a significant threat, as they enable adversaries to replicate proprietary models, compromise protected information, and prepare offline adversarial attacks. However, current defense strategies predominantly rely on the Single Client Assumption (SCA), which is the implicit assumption that attacks originate from isolated identities. This work systematically demonstrates that the SCA is fundamentally invalid in the presence of coordinated threat actors, such as Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). We introduce a modular, open-source framework called CerberusAI for reproducible model-stealing research, and use it to simulate distributed attack scenarios. Our empirical evaluation shows that well-established defense mechanisms, such as Protecting Against Deep Neural Network Model Stealing Attacks (PRADA), can be bypassed by basic round-robin query distribution strategies, resulting in a significant reduction in detection performance. Furthermore, we demonstrate that even global aggregation approaches can be rendered operationally useless through adaptive traffic mixing. These results highlight the need for a paradigm shift towards stateful, identity-independent defense architectures in the field of model extraction attacks. This paper was originally presented at the International Conference on Military Communication and Information Systems (ICMCIS), organized by the Information Systems Technology (IST) Scientific and Technical Committee, IST-224-RSY - the ICMCIS, held in Bath, United Kingdom, 12-13 May 2026 and won the best paper award.

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