RAILS: Verification-Native Clearing For Agentic Commerce

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2606.08790v1
• Date: Sun, 07 Jun 2026 19:12:55 GMT
• Title: RAILS: Verification-Native Clearing For Agentic Commerce
• Abstract summary: Clearing is the missing primitive for agentic commerce.<n>RAILS is the integrity and clearing layer for agentic commerce, spanning a per-output reliability score, a published reliability record, and a clearing function that consumes them.<n>Seven primitives yield a soundness property: no financially material settlement is supported by evidence below the obligation's admissibility floor.
• Score: 0.0
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: Autonomous agents negotiate, purchase, deploy code, and move funds, but no neutral mechanism determines whether they met their delegated obligation, who is responsible when they did not, or which settlement action follows. This is the agentic clearing problem. Tool protocols (MCP), inter-agent communication (A2A), payment rails (x402), mandate and network agent protocols (AP2, Visa, Mastercard), and settlement-risk standards each assume that determination and none produce it. Clearing is the missing primitive. Payment is not clearing. Authorization is not clearing. LLM-as-judge evaluation is not clearing. Settlement-risk escrow is not clearing: it consumes clearing decisions. RAILS (Real-Time Agent Integrity & Ledger Settlement) is the integrity and clearing layer for agentic commerce, spanning a per-output reliability score, a published reliability record, and a clearing function that consumes them. The clearing protocol at its core closes that gap. Seven primitives (Obligation Object, Evidence Envelope, Verification Mesh, Clearing Decision, Settlement Instruction, Clearing Passport, Finality Rules), bound by a formal model of admissibility-graded verification, together yield a soundness property: no financially material settlement is supported by evidence below the obligation's admissibility floor. The property is falsifiable against the spec. We are not aware of a prior agent-commerce verification mechanism that states a property of this kind. The approaches nearest to it emit a pass, a delivery guarantee, a bare score, or an equilibrium. This paper specifies that clearing protocol.

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