InjectV: Modeling Fault Injection Attacks in RISC-V Simulation Environment

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2606.12011v1
• Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2026 12:38:13 GMT
• Title: InjectV: Modeling Fault Injection Attacks in RISC-V Simulation Environment
• Abstract summary: This paper introduces InjectV, a fault injection attack framework for RISC-V platforms built on the gem5 simulator.<n>InjectV enables precise, guided fault injection at security-critical execution points, such as control-flow decisions, counters, and comparisons.
• Score: 39.3098730337656
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Fault Injection Attacks (FIAs) are a significant threat to hardware security, capable of compromising systems by inducing malicious faults in computation or storage. Evaluating resilience against such attacks is challenging due to the high cost, complexity, and limited availability of physical fault experiments, particularly during pre-silicon development. Architectural-level simulation offers a developer-oriented, white-box perspective for systematic vulnerability assessment. This paper introduces InjectV, a fault injection attack framework for RISC-V platforms built on the gem5 simulator. InjectV enables precise, guided fault injection at security-critical execution points, such as control-flow decisions, counters, and comparisons, allowing systematic exploration of attack vectors. It currently supports transient fault attacks in registers and memory, broadening its ability to simulate diverse attack scenarios. Experimental results on security benchmarks from the FISSC suite, including hardened variants of the VerifyPIN application, demonstrate InjectV's ability to effectively identify fault-injection points, achieving a 95.8% time-saving advantage over traditional fault injection approaches.

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