Auditing Belief-Conditioned LLM Agents in Hidden-Information Social Deduction Games

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2607.10814v1
• Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2026 16:03:30 GMT
• Title: Auditing Belief-Conditioned LLM Agents in Hidden-Information Social Deduction Games
• Abstract summary: We build an auditable framework that maintains an external belief state over hidden roles in a 9-player Werewolf environment.<n>We report the effect as an association and treat its mechanism as unresolved.
• Score: 50.880420636090896
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: Evaluating LLM agents in hidden-information multi-agent settings is hard: final outcomes are high-variance and rarely reveal why an agent decided as it did. We study this in a 9-player Werewolf environment where agents act under strict, code-level information isolation, and we build an auditable framework that maintains an external belief state over hidden roles, logs belief updates and belief-action deviations as structured evidence, and supports a defensive offline improvement loop that reviews bad cases before any strategy change. Across 1,080 frozen games spanning belief-disabled, active-belief, kernel-ablation, camp-restricted, consumption-policy, and high-load arms, and including a seed-paired A0/A1 comparison, the active-belief condition is associated with substantially better good-side outcomes: in the 200-seed A0/A1 comparison the good-side win rate rises from 0.205 to 0.390 (paired McNemar $χ^2 = 16.4$, $p < 0.001$), with fewer irreversible witch-poison errors. We do not, however, attribute this shift to belief content. Direct action-belief consistency is low ($\approx 0.21$), and giving belief only to the werewolves helps the good side more than giving it only to the good side, which argues against a simple holder-benefit account; we therefore report the effect as an association and treat its mechanism as unresolved. The contribution is the audit framework itself: it makes the effect measurable, exposes low direct action-belief consistency, rejects an unreliable forced-consumption intervention with evidence, and separates strategy effects from load confounds. We accordingly position external belief in high-noise hidden-information games primarily as an auditable cognitive baseline that also carries decision-relevant signal, turning opaque agent behavior into replayable evidence for safer, controlled iteration.

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