SingGuard-NSFA: Extensible Guardrails for Agentic AI via Generative Reasoning and Real-Time Classification
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2607.13081v1
- Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 07:28:45 GMT
- Title: SingGuard-NSFA: Extensible Guardrails for Agentic AI via Generative Reasoning and Real-Time Classification
- Abstract summary: nsfaguard is a guardrail framework for securing agentic AI systems against operational threats.<n>We first introduce the NSFA taxonomy, which organizes 185 risk variants into a CIA-triad-grounded hierarchy.<n>We develop a dual-mode approach combining SFT-based generative reasoning for interpretable offline auditing with discriminative classification heads on the frozen backbone.
- Score: 0.0
- License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
- Abstract: We present nsfaguard, a guardrail framework for securing agentic AI systems against operational threats, such as prompt injection, sensitive information extraction, malicious code requests, dangerous tool misuse, and resource exhaustion. We first introduce the NSFA taxonomy, which organizes 185 risk variants into a CIA-triad-grounded hierarchy and is cross-validated against three well-established OWASP guidelines. Based on this taxonomy, we construct a benchmark suite spanning 133 languages, comprising over 93K purpose-built samples targeting both user queries and agent responses, along with 3,435 cross-source samples adapted from five public agent-security datasets. To detect these operational threats in practice, we develop a dual-mode approach combining SFT-based generative reasoning for interpretable offline auditing with discriminative classification heads on the frozen backbone, enabling real-time detection at approximately 50,ms. We release four models with 0.8B, 2B, 4B, and 9B parameters, all achieving $\geq$94% F1 on purpose-built benchmarks and surpassing the strongest competing guardrails by 6 to 12 absolute points. On cross-source evaluation, the 9B model attains 91.29% F1 with a more balanced precision--recall trade-off. Moreover, ablation experiments show that classification heads can equip a guardrail with risk detection capabilities beyond its original scope and achieve state-of-the-art performance. These results demonstrate the extensibility of the approach and its generality as a plug-in enhancement.
Related papers
- MaliciousSkillBench: A Comprehensive Benchmark for Malicious Agent Skill Detection [24.37473229751569]
MaliciousSkillBench is a comprehensive benchmark for malicious Agent Skill detection.<n>We consolidate 13 public sources, 11 of which contribute Core malicious artifacts, and reduce 8,414 raw malicious records to 7,539 normalized-unique identities.<n>We then evaluate three learned text detectors and three off-the-shelf Skill scanners.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2026-08-20T11:13:00Z) - Cybersecurity Detection Classification with Reasoning-enabled Language Models [50.72675435043546]
A major issue in Security Operations Centers (SOCs) is alert fatigue.<n>Prior work prompts or fine-tunes large language models (LLMs) to emit a triage label directly, but does not train them to reason about whether a detection is a genuine threat.<n>We train a chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning-enabled triage classifier on real, human-labeled Windows endpoint detections.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2026-07-30T16:22:13Z) - Behavioral Integrity Verification for AI Agent Skills [9.127363793428119]
We formalize this as the behavioral integrity verification (BIV) problem.<n>On 49,943 skills from the OpenClaw registry, the deviation taxonomy reveals a pervasive description-implementation gap.<n>On a 906-skill malicious-skill detection benchmark, BIV reaches an F1 of 0.946, outperforming state-of-the-art rule-based and single-pass LLM baselines.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2026-05-12T08:41:09Z) - Agentic Adversarial Rewriting Exposes Architectural Vulnerabilities in Black-Box NLP Pipelines [34.37967130277969]
We propose a two-agent evasion framework operating in a semantic perturbation space.<n>Evasion rates are 19.95 to 40.34% on modern large language model (LLM) based systems.<n>A pattern-informed defense reduces the evasion rate by up to 65.18%.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2026-04-26T00:58:36Z) - ATBench: A Diverse and Realistic Agent Trajectory Benchmark for Safety Evaluation and Diagnosis [96.92417622318267]
ATBench is a trajectory-level benchmark for structured, diverse, and realistic evaluation of agent safety.<n>It organizes agentic risk along three dimensions: risk source, failure mode, and real-world harm.<n>It contains 1,000 trajectories (503 safe and 497 unsafe), averaging 9.01 turns and 3.95k tokens, with 1,954 invoked tools drawn from pools spanning 2,084 available tools.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2026-04-02T13:26:20Z) - AgentCPM-Explore: Realizing Long-Horizon Deep Exploration for Edge-Scale Agents [75.67445299298949]
AgentCPM-Explore is a compact 4B agent model with high knowledge density and strong exploration capability.<n>We introduce a holistic training framework featuring parameter-space model fusion, reward signal denoising, and contextual information refinement.<n>AgentCPM-Explore achieves state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance among 4B-class models, matches or surpasses 8B-class SOTA models on four benchmarks, and even outperforms larger-scale models such as Claude-4.5-Sonnet or DeepSeek-v3.2 in five benchmarks.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2026-02-06T08:24:59Z) - ReasoningBomb: A Stealthy Denial-of-Service Attack by Inducing Pathologically Long Reasoning in Large Reasoning Models [67.15960154375131]
Large reasoning models (LRMs) extend large language models with explicit multi-step reasoning traces.<n>This capability introduces a new class of prompt-induced inference-time denial-of-service (PI-DoS) attacks that exploit the high computational cost of reasoning.<n>We present ReasoningBomb, a reinforcement-learning-based PI-DoS framework that is guided by a constant-time surrogate reward.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2026-01-29T18:53:01Z) - ReasAlign: Reasoning Enhanced Safety Alignment against Prompt Injection Attack [52.17935054046577]
We present ReasAlign, a model-level solution to improve safety alignment against indirect prompt injection attacks.<n>ReasAlign incorporates structured reasoning steps to analyze user queries, detect conflicting instructions, and preserve the continuity of the user's intended tasks.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2026-01-15T08:23:38Z) - What Matters For Safety Alignment? [38.86339753409445]
This paper presents a comprehensive empirical study on the safety alignment capabilities of AI systems.<n>We systematically investigate and compare the influence of six critical intrinsic model characteristics and three external attack techniques.<n>We identify the LRMs GPT-OSS-20B, Qwen3-Next-80B-A3B-Thinking, and GPT-OSS-120B as the top-three safest models.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2026-01-07T12:31:52Z) - Towards a Science of Scaling Agent Systems [79.64446272302287]
We formalize a definition for agent evaluation and characterize scaling laws as the interplay between agent quantity, coordination structure, modelic, and task properties.<n>We derive a predictive model using coordination metrics, that cross-validated R2=0, enabling prediction on unseen task domains.<n>We identify three effects: (1) a tool-coordination trade-off: under fixed computational budgets, tool-heavy tasks suffer disproportionately from multi-agent overhead, and (2) a capability saturation: coordination yields diminishing or negative returns once single-agent baselines exceed 45%.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2025-12-09T06:52:21Z) - FORTRESS: Frontier Risk Evaluation for National Security and Public Safety [5.544163262906087]
Current benchmarks often fail to test safeguard robustness to potential national security and public safety risks.<n>We introduce FORTRESS: 500 expert-crafted adversarial prompts with instance-based rubrics of 4-7 binary questions.<n>Each prompt-rubric pair has a corresponding benign version to test for model over-refusals.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2025-06-17T19:08:02Z)
This list is automatically generated from the titles and abstracts of the papers in this site.
This site does not guarantee the quality of this site (including all information) and is not responsible for any consequences.