Beyond Detection: Agentic Attack Synthesis and Simulation for Smart Contracts

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2607.15673v1
• Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2026 06:31:49 GMT
• Title: Beyond Detection: Agentic Attack Synthesis and Simulation for Smart Contracts
• Abstract summary: KASS (Knowledge-Augmented Attack Synthesis and Simulation) is a multi-agent framework for executable smart contract exploit verification.<n>It decomposes automated exploit generation into planning, generation, and testing stages.<n>It produces structured attack plans that document exploitation flows, quantify potential asset losses, and serve as semantic false positive filters for static analysis tools.
• Score: 9.850249387268157
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Smart contract vulnerabilities pose severe financial risks, yet existing security tools largely stop at vulnerability detection, offering limited support for explaining whether reported flaws are exploitable, how attacks unfold, and what concrete damage they cause. To bridge this gap, we propose KASS (Knowledge-Augmented Attack Synthesis and Simulation), a multi-agent framework for executable smart contract exploit verification. KASS decomposes automated exploit generation into planning, generation, and testing stages, and integrates three complementary mechanisms: retrieval-augmented planning over real-world audit knowledge, formal generation and validation constraints that bind attack plans to executable proof-of-concept tests, and a hierarchical dual-loop refinement process that repairs code-level errors while triggering strategy-level replanning when attack assumptions fail. We evaluate KASS on 104 SmartBugs-Curated contracts across four vulnerability categories. Experimental results show that KASS successfully generates executable exploits for 94.23% of tested contracts; this rate is higher than previously reported results for REX and AdvSCanner on comparable SmartBugs-Curated subsets, and higher than our reproduced Claude Code baseline under the same evaluation protocol. On 11 real-world CVE-tagged contracts, KASS successfully validates 9 cases. Beyond exploit generation, KASS produces structured attack plans that document exploitation flows, quantify potential asset losses, and serve as semantic false positive filters for static analysis tools.

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