Code-Poisoning Property Inference Attacks

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2607.15970v1
• Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2026 14:04:59 GMT
• Title: Code-Poisoning Property Inference Attacks
• Abstract summary: Property Inference Attacks aim to expose global property information of the training set.<n>We present Code-Poisoning Property Inference Attack (CPPIA), the first code-level PIA.<n>CPPIA offers 100% attack accuracy without degrading model accuracy.
• Score: 12.041733198136326
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
• Abstract: The flourishing code hosting platforms and coding agents enable even beginners with private data to build tailored Machine Learning (ML) models using available code quickly. The training data for ML models, often regarded as private property (e.g., clinical records, transaction information), is at significant risk of information leakage. Property Inference Attacks (PIAs), as a significant type of privacy attack, aim to expose global property information of the training set. In this paper, we present Code-Poisoning Property Inference Attack (CPPIA), the first code-level PIA, which overcomes four limitations of existing works: insufficient attack performance, severe degradation of model accuracy, high computational overhead, and failure under defenses. We consider malicious code providers from code hosting platforms (GitHub) and coding agents (Codex). Upon downloading the poisoned code, data holders train models with their private data without professional auditing, subsequently releasing label-only APIs to the public. The adversary embeds the properties into secret samples during training and queries the trained model on these samples later to leak privacy. CPPIA offers 100\% attack accuracy without degrading model accuracy. It is also computationally lightweight and requires no shadow models. We evaluate the attack performance across four datasets, eight model architectures, eighteen properties, and under three defense mechanisms, demonstrating the universality and effectiveness of CPPIA.

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