RAGuard: A Layered Defense Framework for Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems Against Data Poisoning

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2607.26339v1
• Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2026 23:21:04 GMT
• Title: RAGuard: A Layered Defense Framework for Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems Against Data Poisoning
• Abstract summary: We introduce RAGuard, a layered defense against emphfactual corpus-poisoning attacks on pipelines.<n>The first layer fine-tunes a dense retriever on synthetic poisoned documents (fabricated facts, contradictions, and reasoning traps)<n>The second layer, the ZeroKnowledge Patch ZKIP, is a label-free, black-box filter.
• Score: 0.0815557531820863
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems ground large language models (LLMs) in external corpora, but this reliance exposes them to corpus poisoning: maliciously injected passages that manipulate retrieved evidence. We introduce RAGuard, a layered defense against \emph{factual} corpus-poisoning attacks on RAG pipelines. The first layer adversarially fine-tunes a dense retriever on synthetic poisoned documents (fabricated facts, contradictions, and reasoning traps), teaching it to downrank malicious passages before generation. The second layer, the Zero-Knowledge Inference Patch ZKIP, is a label-free, black-box filter: for each retrieved document, it performs a leave-one-out decode and scores the document by the semantic shift and output-entropy change that its removal induces. ZKIP requires no poison labels, no ground-truth answers, and no access to model internals; it compares the model's own answers under counterfactual contexts. On poisoned Natural Questions at 5--30\% poison ratios, adversarial retriever training alone reduces but does not eliminate attack success, while ZKIP drives the measured attack success rate to 0.000 in every defended configuration, keeping Recall@5 within 0.03 of the clean-corpus baseline. Supervised analyses on both Natural Questions and BEIR (NFCorpus) confirm that the counterfactual signals ZKIP relies on carry learnable poison structure. The defense costs $k{+}1$ generator passes per query ($6\times$ for $k{=}5$); we analyze batching and early-stopping approximations that reduce this overhead. We also show that keyword-preserving poisons leave lexical retrievers such as BM25 essentially unaffected, an observation that delineates the boundary of the threat model. Code, datasets, and evaluation harnesses are released for reproducibility.

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