AgentFlow: A Flow-Centric Policy Language and Framework for Securing LLM Agent Systems

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2608.22868v1
• Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2026 06:56:00 GMT
• Title: AgentFlow: A Flow-Centric Policy Language and Framework for Securing LLM Agent Systems
• Abstract summary: LLM agents increasingly read untrusted content, invoke external tools, access private data, and delegate work to other agents.<n>We present AgentFlow, a flow-centric policy language and runtime enforcement model for specifying where data may travel in agent systems.
• Score: 7.734540679538682
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: LLM agents increasingly read untrusted content, invoke external tools, access private data, and delegate work to other agents. Harm often arises not from a single unsafe action but from the flow of sensitive data across a sequence of otherwise plausible steps. We present AgentFlow, a flow-centric policy language and runtime enforcement model for specifying where data may travel in agent systems. Policies are defined over labeled runtime edges and constrain which tools may receive sensitive fields, which sinks may receive released data, and what authority may cross delegation boundaries. The language supports flow and path rules, task-scoped capabilities, controlled release, and stateful taint semantics. A runtime reference monitor mediates agent actions, and a bounded SMT-based verifier checks safety properties for a structured policy fragment. We evaluate AgentFlow on multiple agent benchmarks. In our prototype, seven safety properties verify in under 0.5 seconds each, and the verifier catches all seeded unsafe policy variants in our study. On 949 AgentDojo injected cases across four suites, AgentFlow reduces confirmed compromise from 33.0\% to 0.0\% while improving aggregate utility from 46.7\% to 63.3\%. On a 200-case AgentDyn Dailylife benchmark, it reduces confirmed compromise from 73.5\% to 0.0\% while preserving near-baseline utility (44.5\% to 43.5\%). Breadth checks across ASB, InjecAgent, BIPIA, AgentHarm, and MCPTox replays suggest that the configured policies block the benchmark-specified policy-visible attacker flows; in ASB's direct-prompt-injection harness, attack success is 0/1{,}200. These results are preliminary and scoped to the modeled policy-visible agent behaviors and evaluated benchmarks.

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