Measuring AI Accountability Through Argumentation Analysis: Can Model Reasoning Withstand Scrutiny?
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2609.05088v1
- Date: Fri, 04 Sep 2026 12:40:39 GMT
- Title: Measuring AI Accountability Through Argumentation Analysis: Can Model Reasoning Withstand Scrutiny?
- Abstract summary: We investigate an alternative standard designed to function despite realistic ambiguity.<n>We use a four-phase dialectical protocol grounded in Walton's theory of argumentation schemes and Govier's criteria for argument cogency.<n>It is adaptive to different frames of reasoning, extends beyond multiple-choice framing, and treats both the reasoning that precedes a verdict and its post-hoc justification.
- Score: 0.0
- License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
- Abstract: AI oversight methods rely on ground truth for validation, but what constitutes appropriate AI behavior is contested. This leaves evaluation of moral reasoning in LLMs and debate-based oversight implicitly avoiding realistic ambiguity. We investigate an alternative standard designed to function despite such ambiguity: structural quality of the defence a model can mount for its verdicts in response to critical questions, measured through a four-phase dialectical protocol grounded in Walton's theory of argumentation schemes and Govier's criteria for argument cogency. The protocol is adaptive to different frames of reasoning, extends beyond multiple-choice framing, and treats both the reasoning that precedes a verdict and its post-hoc justification. Across nine frontier models and 200 high-ambiguity MoralChoice items -- $6,778$ judge-scored cells, validated against $89.6\%$ inter-judge agreement on the binary failure judgment -- models defend their reasoning well above the rubric minimum on every dimension. Failure mass concentrates on grounds and sufficiency, and correlates with epistemic hedging rather than argument length. Reasoning is better defended than post-hoc justification, on every model and every Govier dimension. The scheme a model presents in its justification differs from the one it reasoned with on a substantial share of dilemmas ($\geq 20\%$ per model), despite value-based practical reasoning dominating both tracks. The protocol catches strictly indefensible defences (self-contradiction, false premises), and it surfaces difficulties in characterizing the role of retraction in AI alignment, suggesting a need for more situated evaluations.
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