Beyond Training: A Feasibility Taxonomy for Inference-Time AI Governance

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10105v1
• Date: Wed, 09 Sep 2026 12:37:17 GMT
• Title: Beyond Training: A Feasibility Taxonomy for Inference-Time AI Governance
• Abstract summary: This paper asks which mechanisms are available once the regulatory object shifts from the training run to the inference call.<n>We develop a feasibility taxonomy of twenty inference-time mechanisms across monitoring, verification, and enforcement.<n>We then stress the taxonomy against a two-dimensional adversary model and map each mechanism to four governance scenarios.
• Score: 0.0
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Compute governance today is a governance of training: the thresholds, reporting requirements, and frontier-AI regimes now in force attach to training compute and treat the trained model as the regulatory unit. That picture is incomplete: capability increasingly migrates to the deployment stage through inference-time scaling, agentic scaffolding, and compression onto consumer hardware. This paper asks which mechanisms are available once the regulatory object shifts from the training run to the inference call. We develop a feasibility taxonomy of twenty inference-time mechanisms across monitoring, verification, and enforcement, each rated on a four-point readiness scale against a documented four-vendor evidence base. We then stress the taxonomy against a two-dimensional adversary model (three capability tiers crossed with four adversary roles) and map each mechanism to four governance scenarios (domestic regulation, bilateral or multilateral coordination, industry self-regulation, and compute-marketplace governance). Fifteen of the twenty mechanisms have commercial technical substrates in production today, although governance-grade assurance and adversarial robustness vary substantially. The adversary analysis shows that this readiness holds only against a cooperative deployer and a low-to-medium-capability user: no mechanism rates adequate against a high-capability state-level deployer, and fine-tuning removes the model-internal components of the enforcement cluster, although platform-external controls can persist. A substitution analysis connects the taxonomy to a companion hardware paper as a conditional substitution principle describing when inference-stage and hardware-stage mechanisms provide comparable regulatory coverage under stated conditions. A second-rater reliability check on a random subset of the readiness ratings returned a quadratic-weighted Cohen's kappa of 0.74.

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