The Agent Incident Registry: Toward Preventing Repeated AI Agent Failures
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2609.11030v2
- Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2026 12:00:24 GMT
- Title: The Agent Incident Registry: Toward Preventing Repeated AI Agent Failures
- Abstract summary: We present the Agent Incident Registry (AIR), a source-linked catalog containing 487 records of agent-related events disclosed from 2022 through 2026.<n>AIR supports source-grounded case retrieval and evaluation-scope auditing, not failure-rate or control-efficacy estimation.
- Score: 0.0
- License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
- Abstract: AI agents increasingly act through tools and delegated authority, but general incident repositories rarely capture the mechanisms needed to compare public failures with agent-security evaluations. We present the Agent Incident Registry (AIR) (Project page: https://enkryptai.com/air), a source-linked catalog containing 487 records of agent-related events disclosed from 2022 through 2026. Each record includes supporting evidence, a stable identifier, and missingness-aware labels for causal role, disclosure class, mechanism, and outcome. Among the 336 generative-system records in which the agent acted, 81 involved realized harm (24\%). Realized outcomes concentrate in in-the-wild and safety-failure records, while responsible disclosures and research demonstrations are overwhelmingly demonstrated; the aggregate share therefore characterizes collection composition rather than deployment risk. After initial curation, a second human reviewer checked all 487 records and their existing labels for completeness and correctness. In a deployment-analogue audit, InjecAgent's 1,054 cases occupy three of AIR's twelve surfaces and are all attacker-triggered, whereas AIR contains 92 no-adversary safety failures. AIR supports source-grounded case retrieval and evaluation-scope auditing, not failure-rate or control-efficacy estimation.
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