PDoS: A Profitable Denial-of-Service Attack against Proof-of-Work Blockchain Liveness
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12450v1
- Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2026 05:16:01 GMT
- Title: PDoS: A Profitable Denial-of-Service Attack against Proof-of-Work Blockchain Liveness
- Abstract summary: We present PDoS, a hybrid attack that combines block header signal deterrence with parasitic revenue extraction.<n>In high-fee or high-MEV environments, higher block value can make PoW systems less secure by increasing the attacker's parasitic revenue.<n>To the best of our knowledge, PDoS is the first attack to demonstrate that disrupting PoW blockchain liveness can be economically self-sustaining and even profitable.
- Score: 9.160986728068094
- License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
- Abstract: The security and liveness of Proof-of-Work (PoW) blockchains fundamentally depend on the economic rationality of miners. Existing incentive-driven denial-of-service attacks, such as BDoS, can deter rational miners from participating, but require the attacker to continuously absorb substantial economic losses and are therefore difficult to sustain in high-value networks. Meanwhile, prior infiltration-based withholding attacks are designed to extract revenue rather than to directly disrupt chain liveness. We present PDoS, a hybrid attack that combines block header signal deterrence with parasitic revenue extraction. PDoS disrupts blockchain liveness while exploiting the victim pool's share-reward mechanism to subsidize the attack cost, thereby lowering the adversarial hash-power threshold required to induce rational miners to shut down. We further show a counterintuitive result: in high-fee or high-MEV environments, higher block value can make PoW systems less secure by increasing the attacker's parasitic revenue and pushing the attack across the break-even point into a self-sustaining, or even profitable, regime. To the best of our knowledge, PDoS is the first attack to demonstrate that disrupting PoW blockchain liveness can be economically self-sustaining and even profitable.
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