A Rule Mining-Based Advanced Persistent Threats Detection System

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2105.10053v1
• Date: Thu, 20 May 2021 22:13:13 GMT
• Title: A Rule Mining-Based Advanced Persistent Threats Detection System
• Authors: Sidahmed Benabderrahmane, Ghita Berrada, James Cheney, and Petko Valtchev
• Abstract summary: Advanced persistent threats (APT) are stealthy cyber-attacks aimed at stealing valuable information from target organizations. Provenance-tracking and trace mining are considered promising as they can help find causal relationships between activities and flag suspicious event sequences as they occur. We introduce an unsupervised method that exploits OS-independent features reflecting process activity to detect realistic APT-like attacks from provenance traces.
• Score: 2.75264806444313
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Advanced persistent threats (APT) are stealthy cyber-attacks that are aimed at stealing valuable information from target organizations and tend to extend in time. Blocking all APTs is impossible, security experts caution, hence the importance of research on early detection and damage limitation. Whole-system provenance-tracking and provenance trace mining are considered promising as they can help find causal relationships between activities and flag suspicious event sequences as they occur. We introduce an unsupervised method that exploits OS-independent features reflecting process activity to detect realistic APT-like attacks from provenance traces. Anomalous processes are ranked using both frequent and rare event associations learned from traces. Results are then presented as implications which, since interpretable, help leverage causality in explaining the detected anomalies. When evaluated on Transparent Computing program datasets (DARPA), our method outperformed competing approaches.

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