Backdoor Attacks on Self-Supervised Learning
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2105.10123v1
- Date: Fri, 21 May 2021 04:22:05 GMT
- Title: Backdoor Attacks on Self-Supervised Learning
- Authors: Aniruddha Saha, Ajinkya Tejankar, Soroush Abbasi Koohpayegani, Hamed
Pirsiavash
- Abstract summary: We show that self-supervised learning methods are vulnerable to backdoor attacks.
An attacker poisons a part of the unlabeled data by adding a small trigger (known to the attacker) to the images.
We propose a knowledge distillation based defense algorithm that succeeds in neutralizing the attack.
- Score: 22.24046752858929
- License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
- Abstract: Large-scale unlabeled data has allowed recent progress in self-supervised
learning methods that learn rich visual representations. State-of-the-art
self-supervised methods for learning representations from images (MoCo and
BYOL) use an inductive bias that different augmentations (e.g. random crops) of
an image should produce similar embeddings. We show that such methods are
vulnerable to backdoor attacks where an attacker poisons a part of the
unlabeled data by adding a small trigger (known to the attacker) to the images.
The model performance is good on clean test images but the attacker can
manipulate the decision of the model by showing the trigger at test time.
Backdoor attacks have been studied extensively in supervised learning and to
the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study them for self-supervised
learning. Backdoor attacks are more practical in self-supervised learning since
the unlabeled data is large and as a result, an inspection of the data to avoid
the presence of poisoned data is prohibitive. We show that in our targeted
attack, the attacker can produce many false positives for the target category
by using the trigger at test time. We also propose a knowledge distillation
based defense algorithm that succeeds in neutralizing the attack. Our code is
available here: https://github.com/UMBCvision/SSL-Backdoor .
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