Learning to Elect

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2108.02768v2
• Date: Sat, 7 Aug 2021 20:46:04 GMT
• Title: Learning to Elect
• Authors: Cem Anil, Xuchan Bao
• Abstract summary: Voting systems have a wide range of applications including recommender systems, web search, product design and elections. We show that set-input neural network architectures such as Set Transformers, fully-connected graph networks and DeepSets are both theoretically and empirically well-suited for learning voting rules.
• Score: 7.893831644671976
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Voting systems have a wide range of applications including recommender systems, web search, product design and elections. Limited by the lack of general-purpose analytical tools, it is difficult to hand-engineer desirable voting rules for each use case. For this reason, it is appealing to automatically discover voting rules geared towards each scenario. In this paper, we show that set-input neural network architectures such as Set Transformers, fully-connected graph networks and DeepSets are both theoretically and empirically well-suited for learning voting rules. In particular, we show that these network models can not only mimic a number of existing voting rules to compelling accuracy --- both position-based (such as Plurality and Borda) and comparison-based (such as Kemeny, Copeland and Maximin) --- but also discover near-optimal voting rules that maximize different social welfare functions. Furthermore, the learned voting rules generalize well to different voter utility distributions and election sizes unseen during training.

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