Auction-Based Ex-Post-Payment Incentive Mechanism Design for Horizontal Federated Learning with Reputation and Contribution Measurement

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2201.02410v1
• Date: Fri, 7 Jan 2022 11:44:20 GMT
• Title: Auction-Based Ex-Post-Payment Incentive Mechanism Design for Horizontal Federated Learning with Reputation and Contribution Measurement
• Authors: Jingwen Zhang, Yuezhou Wu, Rong Pan
• Abstract summary: Federated learning trains models across devices with distributed data, while protecting the privacy and obtaining a model similar to that of centralized ML. We design an auction-based incentive mechanism for horizontal federated learning with reputation and contribution measurement.
• Score: 9.503584357135832
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Federated learning trains models across devices with distributed data, while protecting the privacy and obtaining a model similar to that of centralized ML. A large number of workers with data and computing power are the foundation of federal learning. However, the inevitable costs prevent self-interested workers from serving for free. Moreover, due to data isolation, task publishers lack effective methods to select, evaluate and pay reliable workers with high-quality data. Therefore, we design an auction-based incentive mechanism for horizontal federated learning with reputation and contribution measurement. By designing a reasonable method of measuring contribution, we establish the reputation of workers, which is easy to decline and difficult to improve. Through reverse auctions, workers bid for tasks, and the task publisher selects workers combining reputation and bid price. With the budget constraint, winning workers are paid based on performance. We proved that our mechanism satisfies the individual rationality of the honest worker, budget feasibility, truthfulness, and computational efficiency.

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