Protecting fiber-optic quantum key distribution sources against light-injection attacks

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2201.06114v2
• Date: Sat, 24 Sep 2022 09:00:55 GMT
• Title: Protecting fiber-optic quantum key distribution sources against light-injection attacks
• Abstract summary: We propose a countermeasure against the light-injection attacks, consisting of an additional sacrificial component placed at the exit of the source. Off-the-shelf fiber-optic isolators and circulators have desired properties, at least under attack by a continuous-wave high-power laser.
• Score: 0.13980986259786224
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: A well-protected and characterised source in a quantum key distribution system is needed for its security. Unfortunately, the source is vulnerable to light-injection attacks, such as Trojan-horse, laser-seeding, and laser-damage attacks, in which an eavesdropper actively injects bright light to hack the source unit. The hacking laser could be a high-power one that can modify properties of components via the laser-damage attack and also further help the Trojan-horse and other light-injection attacks. Here we propose a countermeasure against the light-injection attacks, consisting of an additional sacrificial component placed at the exit of the source. This component should either withstand high-power incoming light while attenuating it to a safe level that cannot modify the rest of the source, or get destroyed into a permanent high-attenuation state that breaks up the line. We demonstrate experimentally that off-the-shelf fiber-optic isolators and circulators have these desired properties, at least under attack by a continuous-wave high-power laser.

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