Exploring Fairness in District-based Multi-party Elections under
different Voting Rules using Stochastic Simulations
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2203.03720v1
- Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2022 18:03:03 GMT
- Title: Exploring Fairness in District-based Multi-party Elections under
different Voting Rules using Stochastic Simulations
- Authors: Adway Mitra
- Abstract summary: Many democratic societies use district-based elections, where the region under consideration is geographically divided into districts and a representative is chosen for each district based on the preferences of the electors who reside there.
We show that this can lead to situations where many electors are dissatisfied with the election results, which is not desirable in a democracy.
Inspired by current literature on fairness of Machine Learning algorithms, we define measures of fairness to quantify the satisfaction of electors, irrespective of their political choices.
- Score: 0.5076419064097732
- License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
- Abstract: Many democratic societies use district-based elections, where the region
under consideration is geographically divided into districts and a
representative is chosen for each district based on the preferences of the
electors who reside there. These representatives belong to political parties,
and the executive powers are acquired by that party which has a majority of the
elected district representatives. In most systems, each elector can express
preference for one candidate, though they may have a complete or partial
ranking of the candidates/parties. We show that this can lead to situations
where many electors are dissatisfied with the election results, which is not
desirable in a democracy. The results may be biased towards the supporters of a
particular party, and against others. Inspired by current literature on
fairness of Machine Learning algorithms, we define measures of fairness to
quantify the satisfaction of electors, irrespective of their political choices.
We also consider alternative election policies using concepts of voting rules
and rank aggregation, to enable voters to express their detailed preferences
without making the electoral process cumbersome or opaque. We then evaluate
these policies using the aforementioned fairness measures with the help of
Monte Carlo simulations. Such simulations are obtained using a proposed
stochastic model for election simulation, that takes into account community
identities of electors and its role in influencing their residence and
political preferences. We show that this model can simulate actual multi-party
elections in India. Through extensive simulations, we find that allowing voters
to provide 2 preferences reduces the disparity between supporters of different
parties in terms of the election result.
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