Randomized Smoothing under Attack: How Good is it in Pratice?
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2204.14187v1
- Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2022 11:37:40 GMT
- Title: Randomized Smoothing under Attack: How Good is it in Pratice?
- Authors: Thibault Maho, Teddy Furon, Erwan Le Merrer
- Abstract summary: We first highlight the mismatch between a theoretical certification and the practice of attacks on classifiers.
We then perform attacks on randomized smoothing as a defense.
Our main observation is that there is a major mismatch in the settings of the RS for obtaining high certified robustness or when defeating black box attacks.
- Score: 17.323638042215013
- License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
- Abstract: Randomized smoothing is a recent and celebrated solution to certify the
robustness of any classifier. While it indeed provides a theoretical robustness
against adversarial attacks, the dimensionality of current classifiers
necessarily imposes Monte Carlo approaches for its application in practice.
This paper questions the effectiveness of randomized smoothing as a defense,
against state of the art black-box attacks. This is a novel perspective, as
previous research works considered the certification as an unquestionable
guarantee. We first formally highlight the mismatch between a theoretical
certification and the practice of attacks on classifiers. We then perform
attacks on randomized smoothing as a defense. Our main observation is that
there is a major mismatch in the settings of the RS for obtaining high
certified robustness or when defeating black box attacks while preserving the
classifier accuracy.
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