DECK: Model Hardening for Defending Pervasive Backdoors

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2206.09272v1
• Date: Sat, 18 Jun 2022 19:46:06 GMT
• Title: DECK: Model Hardening for Defending Pervasive Backdoors
• Authors: Guanhong Tao, Yingqi Liu, Siyuan Cheng, Shengwei An, Zhuo Zhang, Qiuling Xu, Guangyu Shen, Xiangyu Zhang
• Abstract summary: Pervasive backdoors are triggered by dynamic and pervasive input perturbations. We develop a general pervasive attack based on an encoder-decoder architecture enhanced with a special transformation layer. Our technique can enlarge class distances by 59.65% on average with less than 1% accuracy degradation and no loss.
• Score: 21.163501644177668
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Pervasive backdoors are triggered by dynamic and pervasive input perturbations. They can be intentionally injected by attackers or naturally exist in normally trained models. They have a different nature from the traditional static and localized backdoors that can be triggered by perturbing a small input area with some fixed pattern, e.g., a patch with solid color. Existing defense techniques are highly effective for traditional backdoors. However, they may not work well for pervasive backdoors, especially regarding backdoor removal and model hardening. In this paper, we propose a novel model hardening technique against pervasive backdoors, including both natural and injected backdoors. We develop a general pervasive attack based on an encoder-decoder architecture enhanced with a special transformation layer. The attack can model a wide range of existing pervasive backdoor attacks and quantify them by class distances. As such, using the samples derived from our attack in adversarial training can harden a model against these backdoor vulnerabilities. Our evaluation on 9 datasets with 15 model structures shows that our technique can enlarge class distances by 59.65% on average with less than 1% accuracy degradation and no robustness loss, outperforming five hardening techniques such as adversarial training, universal adversarial training, MOTH, etc. It can reduce the attack success rate of six pervasive backdoor attacks from 99.06% to 1.94%, surpassing seven state-of-the-art backdoor removal techniques.

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