Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Unobserved Agent Rewards and Perfect-Knowledge Agents

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2304.07407v2
• Date: Sun, 7 May 2023 19:30:01 GMT
• Title: Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Unobserved Agent Rewards and Perfect-Knowledge Agents
• Authors: Ilgin Dogan, Zuo-Jun Max Shen, and Anil Aswani
• Abstract summary: We study a scenario of repeated principal-agent games within a multi-armed bandit (MAB) framework. We design our policy by first constructing an estimator for the agent's expected reward for each bandit arm. We conclude with numerical simulations demonstrating the applicability of our policy to real-life setting from collaborative transportation planning.
• Score: 5.773269033551628
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Motivated by a number of real-world applications from domains like healthcare and sustainable transportation, in this paper we study a scenario of repeated principal-agent games within a multi-armed bandit (MAB) framework, where: the principal gives a different incentive for each bandit arm, the agent picks a bandit arm to maximize its own expected reward plus incentive, and the principal observes which arm is chosen and receives a reward (different than that of the agent) for the chosen arm. Designing policies for the principal is challenging because the principal cannot directly observe the reward that the agent receives for their chosen actions, and so the principal cannot directly learn the expected reward using existing estimation techniques. As a result, the problem of designing policies for this scenario, as well as similar ones, remains mostly unexplored. In this paper, we construct a policy that achieves a low regret (i.e., square-root regret up to a log factor) in this scenario for the case where the agent has perfect-knowledge about its own expected rewards for each bandit arm. We design our policy by first constructing an estimator for the agent's expected reward for each bandit arm. Since our estimator uses as data the sequence of incentives offered and subsequently chosen arms, the principal's estimation can be regarded as an analogy of online inverse optimization in MAB's. Next we construct a policy that we prove achieves a low regret by deriving finite-sample concentration bounds for our estimator. We conclude with numerical simulations demonstrating the applicability of our policy to real-life setting from collaborative transportation planning.

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