Understanding Blockchain Governance: Analyzing Decentralized Voting to Amend DeFi Smart Contracts

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.17655v3
• Date: Sun, 21 Apr 2024 17:22:40 GMT
• Title: Understanding Blockchain Governance: Analyzing Decentralized Voting to Amend DeFi Smart Contracts
• Authors: Johnnatan Messias, Vabuk Pahari, Balakrishnan Chandrasekaran, Krishna P. Gummadi, Patrick Loiseau,
• Abstract summary: We review and characterize decentralized governance in practice, using Compound and Uniswap. We reveal a high concentration of voting power in both Compound and Uniswap. We show that voting on Compound proposals can be unfairly expensive for small token holders.
• Score: 17.620751747376726
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
• Abstract: Smart contracts are contractual agreements between participants of a blockchain, who cannot implicitly trust one another. They are software programs that run on top of a blockchain, and we may need to change them from time to time (e.g., to fix bugs or address new use cases). Governance protocols define the means for amending or changing these smart contracts without any centralized authority. They distribute the decision-making power to every user of the smart contract: Users vote on accepting or rejecting every change. In this work, we review and characterize decentralized governance in practice, using Compound and Uniswap -- two widely used governance protocols -- as a case study. We reveal a high concentration of voting power in both Compound and Uniswap: 10 voters hold together 57.86% and 44.72% of the voting power, respectively. Although proposals to change or amend the protocol receive, on average, a substantial number of votes (i.e., 89.39%) in favor within the Compound protocol, they require fewer than three voters to obtain 50% or more votes. We show that voting on Compound proposals can be unfairly expensive for small token holders, and we discover voting coalitions that can further marginalize these users.

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