Iniva: Inclusive and Incentive-compatible Vote Aggregation

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2404.04948v1
• Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2024 12:59:40 GMT
• Title: Iniva: Inclusive and Incentive-compatible Vote Aggregation
• Authors: Arian Baloochestani, Hanish Gogada, Leander Jehl, Hein Meling,
• Abstract summary: This paper presents Iniva, an inclusive and incentive-compatible vote aggregation scheme. Iniva significantly reduces the chance to omit individual votes while ensuring that omitting many votes incurs a significant cost. Our analysis shows that Iniva significantly reduces the chance to omit individual votes while ensuring that omitting many votes incurs a significant cost.
• Score: 0.0
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
• Abstract: Many blockchain platforms use committee-based consensus for scalability, finality, and security. In this consensus scheme, a committee decides which blocks get appended to the chain, typically through several voting phases. Platforms typically leverage the committee members' recorded votes to reward, punish, or detect failures. A common approach is to let the block proposer decide which votes to include, opening the door to possible attacks. For example, a malicious proposer can omit votes from targeted committee members, resulting in lost profits and, ultimately, their departure from the system. This paper presents Iniva, an inclusive and incentive-compatible vote aggregation scheme that prevents such vote omission attacks. Iniva relies on a tree overlay with carefully selected fallback paths, making it robust against process failures without needing reconfiguration or additional redundancy. Our analysis shows that Iniva significantly reduces the chance to omit individual votes while ensuring that omitting many votes incurs a significant cost. In addition, our experimental results show that Iniva enjoys robustness, scalability, and reasonable throughput.

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