The Still Secret Ballot: The Limited Privacy Cost of Transparent Election Results
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2308.04100v3
- Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2024 16:53:29 GMT
- Title: The Still Secret Ballot: The Limited Privacy Cost of Transparent Election Results
- Authors: Shiro Kuriwaki, Jeffrey B. Lewis, Michael Morse,
- Abstract summary: We show how an analyst unravels the secret ballot by uniquely linking votes on an anonymous ballot to the voter's name and address in the public voter file.
We conclude the ballot can be both public and still as secret as it is under typical reporting practices.
- Score: 0.0
- License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
- Abstract: After an election, should officials release an electronic record of each ballot? The release of ballots could bolster the legitimacy of the result. But it may also facilitate vote revelation, where an analyst unravels the secret ballot by uniquely linking votes on an anonymous ballot to the voter's name and address in the public voter file. We first provide a theoretical model of how vote revelation could occur under various election-reporting regimes. Perhaps counterintuitively, releasing ballot records is no more revelatory than the typical practice of releasing aggregate vote tallies by precinct and method. We then present the first empirical evaluation of vote revelation, using the 2020 election in Maricopa County, Arizona, as a case study. For 99.8% of voters, the release of ballot records led to no revelation of any vote choice. We conclude the ballot can be both public and still as secret as it is under typical reporting practices.
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