LESSON: Multi-Label Adversarial False Data Injection Attack for Deep Learning Locational Detection
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2401.16001v1
- Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2024 09:44:59 GMT
- Title: LESSON: Multi-Label Adversarial False Data Injection Attack for Deep Learning Locational Detection
- Authors: Jiwei Tian, Chao Shen, Buhong Wang, Xiaofang Xia, Meng Zhang, Chenhao Lin, Qian Li,
- Abstract summary: This paper proposes a general multi-label adversarial attack framework, namely muLti-labEl adverSarial falSe data injectiON attack (LESSON)
Four typical LESSON attacks based on the proposed framework and two dimensions of attack objectives are examined.
- Score: 15.491101949025651
- License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
- Abstract: Deep learning methods can not only detect false data injection attacks (FDIA) but also locate attacks of FDIA. Although adversarial false data injection attacks (AFDIA) based on deep learning vulnerabilities have been studied in the field of single-label FDIA detection, the adversarial attack and defense against multi-label FDIA locational detection are still not involved. To bridge this gap, this paper first explores the multi-label adversarial example attacks against multi-label FDIA locational detectors and proposes a general multi-label adversarial attack framework, namely muLti-labEl adverSarial falSe data injectiON attack (LESSON). The proposed LESSON attack framework includes three key designs, namely Perturbing State Variables, Tailored Loss Function Design, and Change of Variables, which can help find suitable multi-label adversarial perturbations within the physical constraints to circumvent both Bad Data Detection (BDD) and Neural Attack Location (NAL). Four typical LESSON attacks based on the proposed framework and two dimensions of attack objectives are examined, and the experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed attack framework, posing serious and pressing security concerns in smart grids.
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