Beyond Control: Exploring Novel File System Objects for Data-Only Attacks on Linux Systems

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2401.17618v2
• Date: Sat, 7 Sep 2024 22:49:29 GMT
• Title: Beyond Control: Exploring Novel File System Objects for Data-Only Attacks on Linux Systems
• Authors: Jinmeng Zhou, Jiayi Hu, Ziyue Pan, Jiaxun Zhu, Wenbo Shen, Guoren Li, Zhiyun Qian,
• Abstract summary: We semi-automatically discover and evaluate exploitable non-control data within the file subsystem of the Linux kernel. We use 18 real-world CVEs to evaluate the exploitability of the file system objects using various exploit strategies. We develop 10 end-to-end exploits using a subset of CVEs against the kernel with all state-of-the-art mitigations enabled.
• Score: 15.913967348814323
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: The widespread deployment of control-flow integrity has propelled non-control data attacks into the mainstream. In the domain of OS kernel exploits, by corrupting critical non-control data, local attackers can directly gain root access or privilege escalation without hijacking the control flow. As a result, OS kernels have been restricting the availability of such non-control data. This forces attackers to continue to search for more exploitable non-control data in OS kernels. However, discovering unknown non-control data can be daunting because they are often tied heavily to semantics and lack universal patterns. We make two contributions in this paper: (1) discover critical non-control objects in the file subsystem and (2) analyze their exploitability. This work represents the first study, with minimal domain knowledge, to semi-automatically discover and evaluate exploitable non-control data within the file subsystem of the Linux kernel. Our solution utilizes a custom analysis and testing framework that statically and dynamically identifies promising candidate objects. Furthermore, we categorize these discovered objects into types that are suitable for various exploit strategies, including a novel strategy necessary to overcome the defense that isolates many of these objects. These objects have the advantage of being exploitable without requiring KASLR, thus making the exploits simpler and more reliable. We use 18 real-world CVEs to evaluate the exploitability of the file system objects using various exploit strategies. We develop 10 end-to-end exploits using a subset of CVEs against the kernel with all state-of-the-art mitigations enabled.

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