Evaluating Efficacy of Model Stealing Attacks and Defenses on Quantum Neural Networks

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2402.11687v1
• Date: Sun, 18 Feb 2024 19:35:30 GMT
• Title: Evaluating Efficacy of Model Stealing Attacks and Defenses on Quantum Neural Networks
• Authors: Satwik Kundu, Debarshi Kundu and Swaroop Ghosh
• Abstract summary: Cloud hosting of quantum machine learning (QML) models exposes them to a range of vulnerabilities. Model stealing attacks can produce clone models achieving up to $0.9times$ and $0.99times$ clone test accuracy. To defend against these attacks, we leverage the unique properties of current noisy hardware and perturb the victim model outputs.
• Score: 2.348041867134616
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
• Abstract: Cloud hosting of quantum machine learning (QML) models exposes them to a range of vulnerabilities, the most significant of which is the model stealing attack. In this study, we assess the efficacy of such attacks in the realm of quantum computing. We conducted comprehensive experiments on various datasets with multiple QML model architectures. Our findings revealed that model stealing attacks can produce clone models achieving up to $0.9\times$ and $0.99\times$ clone test accuracy when trained using Top-$1$ and Top-$k$ labels, respectively ($k:$ num\_classes). To defend against these attacks, we leverage the unique properties of current noisy hardware and perturb the victim model outputs and hinder the attacker's training process. In particular, we propose: 1) hardware variation-induced perturbation (HVIP) and 2) hardware and architecture variation-induced perturbation (HAVIP). Although noise and architectural variability can provide up to $\sim16\%$ output obfuscation, our comprehensive analysis revealed that models cloned under noisy conditions tend to be resilient, suffering little to no performance degradation due to such obfuscations. Despite limited success with our defense techniques, this outcome has led to an important discovery: QML models trained on noisy hardwares are naturally resistant to perturbation or obfuscation-based defenses or attacks.

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