OpenVoting: Recoverability from Failures in Dual Voting

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/1908.09557v8
• Date: Thu, 7 Sep 2023 07:24:29 GMT
• Title: OpenVoting: Recoverability from Failures in Dual Voting
• Authors: Prashant Agrawal, Kabir Tomer, Abhinav Nakarmi, Mahabir Prasad Jhanwar, Subodh Sharma, Subhashis Banerjee
• Abstract summary: We consider the setting of emphdual voting protocols, where the cryptographic guarantees of end-to-end verifiable voting are combined with the simplicity of audit using voter-verified paper records (VVPR) We first consider the design requirements of such a system and then suggest a protocol called emphOpenVoting, which identifies a verifiable subset of error-free votes consistent with the VVPRs, and the polling booths corresponding to the votes that fail to verify with possible reasons for the failures.
• Score: 0.3903025330856987
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: In this paper we address the problem of recovery from failures without re-running entire elections when elections fail to verify. We consider the setting of \emph{dual voting} protocols, where the cryptographic guarantees of end-to-end verifiable voting (E2E-V) are combined with the simplicity of audit using voter-verified paper records (VVPR). We first consider the design requirements of such a system and then suggest a protocol called \emph{OpenVoting}, which identifies a verifiable subset of error-free votes consistent with the VVPRs, and the polling booths corresponding to the votes that fail to verify with possible reasons for the failures. To an ordinary voter \emph{OpenVoting} looks just like an old fashioned paper based voting system, with minimal additional cognitive overload.

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