PAD: Patch-Agnostic Defense against Adversarial Patch Attacks

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2404.16452v1
• Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2024 09:32:34 GMT
• Title: PAD: Patch-Agnostic Defense against Adversarial Patch Attacks
• Authors: Lihua Jing, Rui Wang, Wenqi Ren, Xin Dong, Cong Zou,
• Abstract summary: Adversarial patch attacks present a significant threat to real-world object detectors. We show two inherent characteristics of adversarial patches, semantic independence and spatial heterogeneity. We propose PAD, a novel adversarial patch localization and removal method that does not require prior knowledge or additional training.
• Score: 36.865204327754626
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Adversarial patch attacks present a significant threat to real-world object detectors due to their practical feasibility. Existing defense methods, which rely on attack data or prior knowledge, struggle to effectively address a wide range of adversarial patches. In this paper, we show two inherent characteristics of adversarial patches, semantic independence and spatial heterogeneity, independent of their appearance, shape, size, quantity, and location. Semantic independence indicates that adversarial patches operate autonomously within their semantic context, while spatial heterogeneity manifests as distinct image quality of the patch area that differs from original clean image due to the independent generation process. Based on these observations, we propose PAD, a novel adversarial patch localization and removal method that does not require prior knowledge or additional training. PAD offers patch-agnostic defense against various adversarial patches, compatible with any pre-trained object detectors. Our comprehensive digital and physical experiments involving diverse patch types, such as localized noise, printable, and naturalistic patches, exhibit notable improvements over state-of-the-art works. Our code is available at https://github.com/Lihua-Jing/PAD.

Related papers

• Defending Adversarial Patches via Joint Region Localizing and Inpainting [16.226410937026685]
  A series of experiments versus traffic sign classification and detection tasks are conducted to defend against various adversarial patch attacks. We propose a novel defense method based on a localizing and inpainting" mechanism to pre-process the input examples.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2023-07-26T15:11:51Z)
• Architecture-agnostic Iterative Black-box Certified Defense against Adversarial Patches [18.61334396999853]
  adversarial patch attack poses threat to computer vision systems. State-of-the-art certified defenses can be compatible with any model architecture. We propose a novel two-stage Iterative Black-box Certified Defense method, termed IBCD.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2023-05-18T12:43:04Z)
• Task-agnostic Defense against Adversarial Patch Attacks [25.15948648034204]
  Adversarial patch attacks mislead neural networks by injecting adversarial pixels within a designated local region. We present PatchZero, a task-agnostic defense against white-box adversarial patches. Our method achieves SOTA robust accuracy without any degradation in the benign performance.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2022-07-05T03:49:08Z)
• On the Real-World Adversarial Robustness of Real-Time Semantic Segmentation Models for Autonomous Driving [59.33715889581687]
  The existence of real-world adversarial examples (commonly in the form of patches) poses a serious threat for the use of deep learning models in safety-critical computer vision tasks. This paper presents an evaluation of the robustness of semantic segmentation models when attacked with different types of adversarial patches. A novel loss function is proposed to improve the capabilities of attackers in inducing a misclassification of pixels.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2022-01-05T22:33:43Z)
• Segment and Complete: Defending Object Detectors against Adversarial Patch Attacks with Robust Patch Detection [142.24869736769432]
  Adversarial patch attacks pose a serious threat to state-of-the-art object detectors. We propose Segment and Complete defense (SAC), a framework for defending object detectors against patch attacks. We show SAC can significantly reduce the targeted attack success rate of physical patch attacks.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2021-12-08T19:18:48Z)
• We Can Always Catch You: Detecting Adversarial Patched Objects WITH or WITHOUT Signature [3.5272597442284104]
  In this paper, we explore the detection problems about the adversarial patch attacks to the object detection. A fast signature-based defense method is proposed and demonstrated to be effective. The newly generated adversarial patches can successfully evade the proposed signature-based defense. We present a novel signature-independent detection method based on the internal content semantics consistency.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2021-06-09T17:58:08Z)
• Bias-based Universal Adversarial Patch Attack for Automatic Check-out [59.355948824578434]
  Adversarial examples are inputs with imperceptible perturbations that easily misleading deep neural networks(DNNs) Existing strategies failed to generate adversarial patches with strong generalization ability. This paper proposes a bias-based framework to generate class-agnostic universal adversarial patches with strong generalization ability.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2020-05-19T07:38:54Z)
• Adversarial Training against Location-Optimized Adversarial Patches [84.96938953835249]
  adversarial patches: clearly visible, but adversarially crafted rectangular patches in images. We first devise a practical approach to obtain adversarial patches while actively optimizing their location within the image. We apply adversarial training on these location-optimized adversarial patches and demonstrate significantly improved robustness on CIFAR10 and GTSRB.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2020-05-05T16:17:00Z)
• Certified Defenses for Adversarial Patches [72.65524549598126]
  Adversarial patch attacks are among the most practical threat models against real-world computer vision systems. This paper studies certified and empirical defenses against patch attacks.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2020-03-14T19:57:31Z)

This list is automatically generated from the titles and abstracts of the papers in this site.

This site does not guarantee the quality of this site (including all information) and is not responsible for any consequences.