Architecture-agnostic Iterative Black-box Certified Defense against Adversarial Patches

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.10929v1
• Date: Thu, 18 May 2023 12:43:04 GMT
• Title: Architecture-agnostic Iterative Black-box Certified Defense against Adversarial Patches
• Authors: Di Yang, Yihao Huang, Qing Guo, Felix Juefei-Xu, Ming Hu, Yang Liu, Geguang Pu
• Abstract summary: adversarial patch attack poses threat to computer vision systems. State-of-the-art certified defenses can be compatible with any model architecture. We propose a novel two-stage Iterative Black-box Certified Defense method, termed IBCD.
• Score: 18.61334396999853
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: The adversarial patch attack aims to fool image classifiers within a bounded, contiguous region of arbitrary changes, posing a real threat to computer vision systems (e.g., autonomous driving, content moderation, biometric authentication, medical imaging) in the physical world. To address this problem in a trustworthy way, proposals have been made for certified patch defenses that ensure the robustness of classification models and prevent future patch attacks from breaching the defense. State-of-the-art certified defenses can be compatible with any model architecture, as well as achieve high clean and certified accuracy. Although the methods are adaptive to arbitrary patch positions, they inevitably need to access the size of the adversarial patch, which is unreasonable and impractical in real-world attack scenarios. To improve the feasibility of the architecture-agnostic certified defense in a black-box setting (i.e., position and size of the patch are both unknown), we propose a novel two-stage Iterative Black-box Certified Defense method, termed IBCD.In the first stage, it estimates the patch size in a search-based manner by evaluating the size relationship between the patch and mask with pixel masking. In the second stage, the accuracy results are calculated by the existing white-box certified defense methods with the estimated patch size. The experiments conducted on two popular model architectures and two datasets verify the effectiveness and efficiency of IBCD.

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