Safe Training with Sensitive In-domain Data: Leveraging Data Fragmentation To Mitigate Linkage Attacks

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2404.19486v1
• Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2024 12:09:55 GMT
• Title: Safe Training with Sensitive In-domain Data: Leveraging Data Fragmentation To Mitigate Linkage Attacks
• Authors: Mariia Ignashina, Julia Ive,
• Abstract summary: Current text generation models are trained using real data which can potentially contain sensitive information. We propose a safer alternative which sees fragmented data in the form of domain-specific short phrases randomly grouped together.
• Score: 2.8186733524862158
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: Current text generation models are trained using real data which can potentially contain sensitive information, such as confidential patient information and the like. Under certain conditions output of the training data which they have memorised can be triggered, exposing sensitive data. To mitigate against this risk we propose a safer alternative which sees fragmented data in the form of domain-specific short phrases randomly grouped together shared instead of full texts. Thus, text fragments that could re-identify an individual cannot be reproduced by the model in one sequence, giving significant protection against linkage attacks. We fine-tune several state-of-the-art LLMs using meaningful syntactic chunks to explore their utility. In particular, we fine-tune BERT-based models to predict two cardiovascular diagnoses. Our results demonstrate the capacity of LLMs to benefit from the pre-trained knowledge and deliver classification results when fine-tuned with fragmented data comparable to fine-tuning with full training data.

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