Learning under Imitative Strategic Behavior with Unforeseeable Outcomes
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2405.01797v1
- Date: Fri, 3 May 2024 00:53:58 GMT
- Title: Learning under Imitative Strategic Behavior with Unforeseeable Outcomes
- Authors: Tian Xie, Zhiqun Zuo, Mohammad Mahdi Khalili, Xueru Zhang,
- Abstract summary: We propose a Stackelberg game to model the interplay between individuals and the decision-maker.
We show that the objective difference between the two can be decomposed into three interpretable terms.
- Score: 14.80947863438795
- License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
- Abstract: Machine learning systems have been widely used to make decisions about individuals who may best respond and behave strategically to receive favorable outcomes, e.g., they may genuinely improve the true labels or manipulate observable features directly to game the system without changing labels. Although both behaviors have been studied (often as two separate problems) in the literature, most works assume individuals can (i) perfectly foresee the outcomes of their behaviors when they best respond; (ii) change their features arbitrarily as long as it is affordable, and the costs they need to pay are deterministic functions of feature changes. In this paper, we consider a different setting and focus on imitative strategic behaviors with unforeseeable outcomes, i.e., individuals manipulate/improve by imitating the features of those with positive labels, but the induced feature changes are unforeseeable. We first propose a Stackelberg game to model the interplay between individuals and the decision-maker, under which we examine how the decision-maker's ability to anticipate individual behavior affects its objective function and the individual's best response. We show that the objective difference between the two can be decomposed into three interpretable terms, with each representing the decision-maker's preference for a certain behavior. By exploring the roles of each term, we further illustrate how a decision-maker with adjusted preferences can simultaneously disincentivize manipulation, incentivize improvement, and promote fairness.
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