Conformal Online Auction Design

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2405.07038v1
• Date: Sat, 11 May 2024 15:28:25 GMT
• Title: Conformal Online Auction Design
• Authors: Jiale Han, Xiaowu Dai,
• Abstract summary: COAD incorporates both the bidder and item features to provide an incentive-compatible mechanism for online auctions. It employs a distribution-free, prediction interval-based approach using conformal prediction techniques. COAD admits the use of a broad array of modern machine-learning methods, including random forests, kernel methods, and deep neural nets.
• Score: 6.265829744417118
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: This paper proposes the conformal online auction design (COAD), a novel mechanism for maximizing revenue in online auctions by quantifying the uncertainty in bidders' values without relying on assumptions about value distributions. COAD incorporates both the bidder and item features and leverages historical data to provide an incentive-compatible mechanism for online auctions. Unlike traditional methods for online auctions, COAD employs a distribution-free, prediction interval-based approach using conformal prediction techniques. This novel approach ensures that the expected revenue from our mechanism can achieve at least a constant fraction of the revenue generated by the optimal mechanism. Additionally, COAD admits the use of a broad array of modern machine-learning methods, including random forests, kernel methods, and deep neural nets, for predicting bidders' values. It ensures revenue performance under any finite sample of historical data. Moreover, COAD introduces bidder-specific reserve prices based on the lower confidence bounds of bidders' valuations, which is different from the uniform reserve prices commonly used in the literature. We validate our theoretical predictions through extensive simulations and a real-data application. All code for using COAD and reproducing results is made available on GitHub.

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