No Algorithmic Collusion in Two-Player Blindfolded Game with Thompson Sampling

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2405.17463v1
• Date: Thu, 23 May 2024 08:21:48 GMT
• Title: No Algorithmic Collusion in Two-Player Blindfolded Game with Thompson Sampling
• Authors: Ningyuan Chen, Xuefeng Gao, Yi Xiong,
• Abstract summary: We show that when the players use Thompson sampling, the game dynamics converge to the Nash equilibrium under a mild assumption on the payoff matrices. algorithmic collusion doesn't arise in this case despite the fact that the players do not intentionally deploy competitive strategies.
• Score: 10.376707874029561
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
• Abstract: When two players are engaged in a repeated game with unknown payoff matrices, they may be completely unaware of the existence of each other and use multi-armed bandit algorithms to choose the actions, which is referred to as the ``blindfolded game'' in this paper. We show that when the players use Thompson sampling, the game dynamics converges to the Nash equilibrium under a mild assumption on the payoff matrices. Therefore, algorithmic collusion doesn't arise in this case despite the fact that the players do not intentionally deploy competitive strategies. To prove the convergence result, we find that the framework developed in stochastic approximation doesn't apply, because of the sporadic and infrequent updates of the inferior actions and the lack of Lipschitz continuity. We develop a novel sample-path-wise approach to show the convergence.

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