Consciousness defined: requirements for biological and artificial general intelligence

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2406.01648v1
• Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2024 14:20:56 GMT
• Title: Consciousness defined: requirements for biological and artificial general intelligence
• Authors: Craig I. McKenzie,
• Abstract summary: Critically, consciousness is the apparatus that provides the ability to make decisions, but it is not defined by the decision itself. requirements for consciousness include: at least some capability for perception, a memory for the storage of such perceptual information. We can objectively determine consciousness in any conceivable agent, such as non-human animals and artificially intelligent systems.
• Score: 0.0
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
• Abstract: Consciousness is notoriously hard to define with objective terms. An objective definition of consciousness is critically needed so that we might accurately understand how consciousness and resultant choice behaviour may arise in biological or artificial systems. Many theories have integrated neurobiological and psychological research to explain how consciousness might arise, but few, if any, outline what is fundamentally required to generate consciousness. To identify such requirements, I examine current theories of consciousness and corresponding scientific research to generate a new definition of consciousness from first principles. Critically, consciousness is the apparatus that provides the ability to make decisions, but it is not defined by the decision itself. As such, a definition of consciousness does not require choice behaviour or an explicit awareness of temporality despite both being well-characterised outcomes of conscious thought. Rather, requirements for consciousness include: at least some capability for perception, a memory for the storage of such perceptual information which in turn provides a framework for an imagination with which a sense of self can be capable of making decisions based on possible and desired futures. Thought experiments and observable neurological phenomena demonstrate that these components are fundamentally required of consciousness, whereby the loss of any one component removes the capability for conscious thought. Identifying these requirements provides a new definition for consciousness by which we can objectively determine consciousness in any conceivable agent, such as non-human animals and artificially intelligent systems.

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